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CIVIL PROCEDURE

-

REFLECTIONS ON THE COMPARISON OF
SYSTEMS*
BENJAMIN KAPLAN**

N INETEEN

sixty-one promises to be a jubilee year for procedure and
proceduralists in the State of New York. For the legislature will be considering a proposal, prepared over a period of more than five years by the Advisory
Committee on Practice and Procedure, to overhaul the entire existing complex
of statutes and rules governing the conduct of civil cases in the courts. This
proposal will be vigorously debated in and out of official halls; indeed one can
already hear the premonitory rumblings of combat if one puts one's ear to the
ground. I do not intend in this lecture to enter. the lists and deal specifically
with the proposal. Although I am an ancient member of the New York Bar,
bearing scars of innumerable collisions with the fifteen hundred sections of
the Civil Practice Act, I have for some years been an academic outlander, and
criticism of the new legislation by me might be no more welcome in some
quarters than Mr. Khrushchev's volunteered views about one of our national
elections. In all events, I am determined to remain asceptically noncontroversial, and I shall say merely that the legislation-of which Professor
Weinstein of Columbia was the chief designer, and to which Professor Kochery
of Buffalo and other colleagues contributed-is by and large a great improvement over the procedural patterns it is intended to supersede.
With this profession of strict neutrality about the New York reform, I
take up a position au-dessus de la m~l6e. In fact for a long moment I shall
abandon the local scene altogether and talk about procedure in a Continental
civil-law system, that of Western Germany. I shall try to pack that procedure
into a medium-sized nutshell. I shall then speak of certain of the forces that
shaped the German system, and reach out for various contrasts between the
German and American procedure. I shall attempt a few observations about
comparative procedure and procedure in general, veering back occasionally to
our particular domestic concerns.
I.
To begin, the rules governing civil procedure in Germany today are laid
down by legislative enactment stemming from the famous code of 1877;
judicial rule-making plays virtually no part. There is no jury. The courts,
at least those concerned in the regular proceedings for cases of consequence,
are collegial in structure, acting through benches of three or-in the court of
final review-five judges. To some extent, however, the plural bench may use
a single judge as a representative or helper.
One of the leitmotifs of the German process is sounded by the Siegfried
•The James McCormick Mitchell Lecture, delivered at the University of Buffalo
School of Law, November 15, 1960.
** Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
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horn of the summons in the action. This invites appearance at a Termin zur
miindlichen Verkandlung, a court-session for oral-argument, or rather for conference, since the ideal style of proceeding is less that of a contentious confrontation than a cooperative discussion. The conference is set perhaps three
to four weeks after initial service of the papers-which by the way is usually
accomplished by mail-and it is commonly attended by the parties as well as
counsel. Now the point to be made is that the whole procedure up to judgment may be viewed as being essentially a series of such conferences, the rest
of the process having a sort of dependent status. Prooftaking occurs to the
extent necessary in the spaces, as it were, between conferences. Intermediate
decisions are made along the way. But the conferences are the heart of the
matter. Very promptly, then, the litigants are brought under the eye of the
court and the case begins to be shaped; and this treatment is applied to the
action at intervals until it is fully opened and finally broken. "Conference"
betokens informality and this characterizes the entire German procedure.
"Conference" also suggests what is the fact, that possibilities of settlement are
openly, vigorously, and continually exploited.
I must relate German pleadings to the conference method-I shall use
the word "pleadings" although these writings are quite different from the
American variety. The action starts with a complaint served together with the
summons, but beyond this there is no prescribed number or sequence of pleadings. Pleadings are to be put in in such numbers and at such times as to prepare
for, strengthen, and expedite the conferences and thereby the general movement
of the case. They have no position independent of the conferences. Indeed the
framers of the code of 1877 looked to a free, oral restatement of the pleadings
at conference. Such oral recapitulation no longer occurs: the court reads the
pleadings in advance and the lawyers are assumed to adopt the pleadings
except as they speak up to the contrary. Still no question arises as to the
sufficiency of the pleadings as such, nor is there any motion practice directed
to the pleadings themselves. In short, pleadings merge into, are an ingredient
of the conferences. What is wanted from the pleadings as adopted and perhaps revised at conference is a narrative of the facts as the parties see them
at the time, with offers of proof-mainly designated witnesses and documents
-and demands for relief. There is no insistence on niceties of form, and legal
argumentation, though strictly out of place, is common in today's pleadings.
Amendments, even drastic amendments, of the statements can be made until
the end of the case, normally without any penalty for late change. This
malleability of the pleadings flows from the realization and expectation that
a case may change its content and color as it is repeatedly discussed and as
proof is from time to time adduced.
Returning to the conduct of the conferences, we find the presiding judge
highly vocal and dominant, the parties themselves often voluble, the lawyers
relatively subdued. To understand the judicial attitude and contribution at
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conference, we must take account of two related concepts. First, there is the
principle jura novit curia, the court knows and applies the law without relying
on the parties to bring it forward. Second, article 139 of the code, as strengthened in recent years, imposes a duty on all courts to clarify the cause and lead
the parties toward full development of their respective positions. Thus with
awareness of the law implicit in the case, the court is obliged to discuss it
freely with the litigants, and in that light to indicate what will be material to
decision. By discussion with counsel and the parties the court completes the
picture of the controversy as presented by the litigants, throwing light upon
obscurities, correcting misunderstandings, marking out areas of agreement and
disagreement. It spurs and guides the parties to any necessary further exploration of facts and theories, and may suggest appropriate allegations, proof
offers, and demands. The court, however, is not bound to take over and commandeer the litigation, nor does it have the power to do so in an ultimate sense.
To some degree-the power is greater in "family" matters than in ordinary
cases-the court may call up evidence and background information and disregard parties' admissions. The calling of experts is basically a matter for the
court. But, in general, allegations, proof offers, and demands can be made only
by the parties and so in the last analysis major control of the cause-materials
remains with them. Nevertheless, as the parties are likely to follow the court's
suggestions, we have here a significant potential in the court which imparts a
special quality to the procedure; and this is so despite the fact that clarification
and leading are hardly noticeable in simpler cases where the lawyers seem to be
providing competent representation. The role of the court not only at conference but throughout the proceedings is envisioned as being both directive
and protective. The court as vigorous chairman is to move the case along at
a good pace, stirring the parties to action on their own behalf, exercising its
limited sua sponte powers where necessary, conscious of a duty to strive for
the right solution of the controversy regardless of faults of advocacy.
Conferences propel the lawsuit. Most dates are set by the court in open
session. It acts in discretion with due regard to the convenience of the parties:
few "iron" time provisions are laid down in the code, and the parties cannot
control the pace by stipulation. When discussions disclose ripe questions of
law, a time will be set for decision. If they show up disputed issues of fact,
there will be an order and a time set for prooftaking.
To understand German prooftaking, we have first to ask what investigation of the facts a German lawyer customarily makes. He consults his client
and his client's papers. But he has substantially no coercive means of "discovering" material for the purpose of preparing his proof offers or readying
himself for prooftaking. Moreover he is by no means at liberty to go out and
talk informally with prospective witnesses. He is hobbled by the principle that
he is to avoid all suspicion of influencing those who may be later called to give
evidence in court. I shall not attempt to mark the exact boundaries of this
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inhibition or to dredge up the possible evasive contrivances. I shall simply say
that German lawyers are not prime movers with respect to the facts. The
regime just described does make for unrehearsed witnesses. It begins to explain why a party in German litigation is not charged with any "proprietorship" over the witnesses whom he has nominated and neither "vouches" for
them nor is "bound" by their testimony.
The court draws up the order for prooftaking, the Beweisbeschluss, from
the nominations set out in the pleadings as they may have been revised at conference. Prooftaking need not be concentrated at a single session, and is in
fact not often so concentrated. Accordingly the court may pick and choose
what it wants to hear at particular sessions. It can take proof in any orderevidence on a defense ahead of evidence on the main case, even evidence on the
negative of an issue ahead of the affirmative.
Witnesses are sequestered, kept out of the courtroom until called. The
court asks the witness to state what he knows about the proof theme on which
he has been summoned. When the witness has done that in narrative without
undue interruption, the court interrogates him, and this is the principal interrogation. Counsel put supplemental questions. Lawyers' participation is
likely to be meager. If a lawyer puts too many questions he is implying that
the court does not know its business, and that is a dubious tactic. A full
stenographic transcript is not kept. Instead the court dictates a summary of
the witness' testimony for the minutes which is then read back and perhaps
corrected.
German law has few rules excluding relevant evidence. In general relevant
evidence is admissible and when admitted is freely evaluated: thus there is no
bar to the admission of hearsay. But a few qualifications must be made.
German law recognizes a series of privileges. It is somewhat irresolute in compelling production in court of various kinds of documentary proof. Testimony
will be received from the parties themselves only in particular circumstances
defined by law, and in no event may a party be compelled to testify. Partytestimony is viewed as a kind of last resort. This raises a quiddity, for parties
are regularly heard in conference, nominally for purposes of clarification, not
proof. I say "nominally" because German law tends to blur the line between
evidence stricto sensu and other happenings in the courtroom.
Prooftaking is succeeded by conference, conference by prooftaking, and
so on to the end of the regular proceedings in the first-instance court; and
now we naturally ask, are there any shortcuts, any special devices for closing
a case out promptly when it appears that there is overwhelming strength on
one side and corresponding weakness on the other? The answer is no. The
German system relies on the succession of conferences and prooftakings to
show up strength or weakness with reasonable dispatch. Nor is there much in
the way of stage-preclusion, that is, rules intended to discourage delaying afterthoughts by requiring that particular offers or objections be made at fixed points
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in the proceeding on pain of being otherwise lost to the party. The German
action is not segmented into clear-cut stages-recall how pleadings may be
thrown in late in the day-and it has in general a quality of "wholeness" or
unity. But we do need to say here that the German system makes interestingly
brisk provision for handling defaults; and we should also call attention to
certain special speed-up devices: "dunning" proceedings, Mahnverfahren, available for "collection" cases and carried on regardless of amount in the inferior
one-judge court; and "documentary-process," Urkundenprozess, used chiefly in
suits on commercial paper, with proof initially limited to documents and partytestimony.
We come now to appellate review. The most notable fact about it is that
on appeal to the court of second instance from final judgment, or from the
important type of intermediate judgment which determines liability but leaves
damages to be ascertained, the parties are entitled to a redoing of the case.
The record made below, so far as it is thought to be free of error, stands as
part of the proceedings, but the parties may add new proofs and invoke new
legal theories, and the conduct of the cause is quite similar to that in the court
below. Remember that article 139 on clarification and leading, with related
duties and powers, continues to apply. The final court of review hears "re
visions" on questions of law. As to matters of substance as distinguished from
procedure, the court is not confined to the grounds urged by counsel. It seems
a mark of the reality of the principle jura novit curia that this national court,
dealing with a very large number of revisions coming up from the lower courts
administered by the states, the Linder, is served by a bar limited by law to
less than a score of lawyers.
The German court system is manned by a quite sizeable number of judges.
They are career men, appointed on the basis of government examinations,
modestly paid, of good but not exalted social prestige, looking primarily to
ministerial departments of justice for advancement. In normal times men
customarily enter into judicial service at an early age, generally without substantial experience in practice. Judges have traditionally been chided for
Lebensfremdheit, undue detachment from the rough-and-tumble of life. We
have caught a hint of their paternalistic role in the court procedure. This is
not far distant from, indeed it comprises, an element of the bureaucratic.
Working, many of them, in collegial courts whose judgments, stiffly authoritative in style, disclose neither individual authorship nor individual dissent,
German judges live rather anonymous lives. And they are desk-bound through
a large part of their working time, for files must be read in preparation for
court sessions, and most decisions in actions large and small must be compendiously written up.
As to the German lawyers, I must avoid leaving the impression that their
contribution to litigation is unimportant, or that their attitude is flaccid. Despite
the court's capacity for active interposition, the frame of the case is made by
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the lawyers and there is room for contentious striving. Still the procedural
system we have outlined does not make for notably vigorous performance by

counsel. Moreover the education of lawyers tends against their full identification with clients as combatants: a significant part of their post-University

required training is as apprentice-judges. Most important, we must notice some
economic facts. Lawyers' fees for litigation, generally corresponding with
statutory scales fixed in relation to the amount in controversy, are low.
Court costs are also fixed by statute in relation to the amount in suit, so
that a litigant is on the one hand prompted to moderate his demand for judgment, and can on the other hand make a reasonably accurate advance estimate
of the expense of litigation. Taking all elements of expense into consideration,
German litigation is cheap by comparison with the American brand. But on
the threshold a German litigant must conjure with the fact that if as plaintiff
or defendant he turns out loser in the lawsuit, he will have to reimburse his
opponent's expenses-counsel fees and court costs at the statutory rates together with ordinary disbursements. Let us note here that contingent-fee arrangements-agreements for quota litis-are proscribed in German practice.
A comprehensive system of state-provided legal aid aims to enable not only
downright paupers but any citizens of insufficient means to prosecute or defend
civil cases upon a plausible showing of a prospect of success.
Lastly I must respond to the nervous question which any American lawyer
would surely want to ask: Does the German system get over its court business
without undue delay? German court statistics-at least those publicly available
and not held in subterranean tunnels by the ministries-are curiously sparse;
but these figures combine with the opinion of German lawyers familiar with the
scene to indicate that the courts, although handling a very considerable volume
of cases, are disposing of their calendars with fair speed. However, the court of
final review-the Bundesgerichtshof sitting in Karlsruhe, successor to the
famous Reicksgericht which used to reside in Leipzig-has had a hard time
in recent years overcoming a serious backlog.
II.
The nutshell is now fully packed. To vary the figure of speech, I have
sought to do a rough charcoal sketch of the German process which might prepare for a modulated painting in oil. I have had to omit many necessary qualifications.' At some points I have perhaps let the ideal overweigh the real; I
have not stopped to say that in Germany as with us procedural forms are in
practice sometimes utterly debased. I am no doubt led by prior acquaintance
with American procedure to some distorted or false ideas about the German.
1. A more detailed account is given in Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, Phases of
German Civil Procedure, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1193, 1443 (1958).

The present lecture is an outgrowth of comparative work in German and American
civil procedure which I am pursuing jointly with my colleague Professor Arthur T. von
Mehren.

REFLECTIONS ON THE COMPARISON OF SYSTEMS
As Holmes remarked about a foreign legal system, "When we contemplate such
a system from the outside it seems like a wall of stone, every part even with
all the others.... But to one brought up within it, varying emphasis, tacit
assumptions, unwritten practices, a thousand influences gained only from life,
may give to the different parts wholly new values that logic and grammar never
could have got from the books.' 2 Yet I think one observation can be made
with confidence about the German process: it differs materially from the
American, differs not merely in particulars but in general features. Let your
mind range backward over my account of German procedure and contrast for
the two systems the modes of determiniig and allocating expenses of litigation; the character and functions of the lawyers and of the judges; the concept of appeal; the approach to facts and proof; the pleadings; the central
motor power of the process as a whole. Our short journey through the German
system may well make us wary of joining hands with those amiable scholars
who like to conclude, even over great apparent odds, that legal institutions in
the Western world are in essence really the same.
We can agree that if analysis is carried on at a sufficiently high level of
abstraction, all processes for rational decisions of disputes by governmental
authority will be seen to have certain broad similarities. The logic and fundamental decencies of controversy tend to impose uniformities. We must grant,
too, that the professed ultimate aims of most if not all modern procedural systems are much alike. Surely the German jurist would say that his system aims
at careful consideration of law and fact, resoluteness, speed, economy, and impartiality in handling cases: aims shortly stated in the American Federal Rules,
as well as in the legislation proposed for New York, as "the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination" of every action. It will indeed be one of the fascinating tasks of comparative scholarship to show how procedural systems announcing similar goals came to develop their divergent procedural institutions.
"Very deep is the well of the past," said Thomas Mann; and he asked,
"Should we not call it bottomless?" Let Mann's riddling question stand, and
consider the course of the intertwined English and American procedural history
since the turn of the nineteenth century. Recall the scene upon which Jeremy
Bentham and Lord Brougham erupted; the issues to which David Dudley
Field's New York Code of 1848 and the English legislation of the 1870's responded; in recent memory, the challenges presented to Charles E. Clark and
his colleagues when they set about formulating the Federal Civil Rules of
1938. Examining German procedural history, the must-do's, can't-do's, and
lesser compulsions and inhibitions which have channelled the development of
German procedural institutions, we shall find few real counterparts to the
Anglo-American story.
German scholarship has provided us only with bits and pieces of the
political, social, and intellectual forces that produced the modern code. It is,
2. Diaz v. Gonzalez, 261 U.S. 102, 106 (1923).
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however, plain that the men who met in the 1870's under the leadership of the
astute Hannoverian lawyer, Adolf Leonhardt, to frame a uniform procedural
code for all of Germany, were executors of the half-formed designs of the
liberals of 1848, and were responding to battle cries and slogans of that and
indeed of a previous era which in the course of time had become irreducible
popular demands.
The Emperor Napoleon had brought to conquered German states and
principalities a new system for the administration of justice fathered by French
revolutionary thought. After the final departure of Napoleon, the movement for
deutsche Rechtseinheit, German leg'al unity, a phase of larger pressures for
German political unification, took up standards in one way or another associated
which the French incursion. Thus we hear great outcries for equality of citizens in the legal process, which meant the abolition of patrimonial jurisdiction
and of special access of favored classes to particular courts. We hear demands
for independence of the courts in the double sense of separation of the judicial
function from the executive and of protection of judges from arbitrary interference with status and tenure. There is widespread agitation for a jury in
criminal cases. Finally the slogans of "orality" and "publicity" are set loose
in the land.
By contrast with the so-called "common" procedure then prevailing in
German territory, a secretive, written, stiff procedure, the French system, the
code de procedure civile of 1806, had proclaimed itself as open, oral, flexible,
informal. The French mode introduced in the Prussian Rhineland held on for
well over a half-century: resistance of this province to the Prussianization of
its law is a long tale of odd surprises involving some of the great names of
German legal science, including Savigny. French procedure caught the liberal
imagination and brought forth a rationalizing German literature centering upon
the idea that the parties in litigation should confront each other in free debate
in the sight and hearing of the court, and the further idea that the court process
should be open to the view of the parties and the public. The important writings of Anselmi von Feuerbach, although seeking to avoid reproaches of Francophilism, elevated these notions almost to the rank of natural rights. Over
a long period of time German liberals could point to the Rhineland as proof
that French transplants could survive on native soil. Emotive power was
added to the reform program for civil procedure by linkage with forces urging
vital changes in criminal procedure, and all these demands took on messianic
coloring as part and parcel of the revolutionary struggle of 1848. In 1849
the abortive constitution written by the National Assembly in the Paulskirche
at Frankfurt adopted orality and publicity as central features of court process.
In the same year an attempt to pacify opinion in Hannover by a somewhat
liberalized code on the lines of the "common" procedure collapsed entirely. In
1850 Hannover adopted a code of civil procedure blending French ideassome of them as transformed in a Swiss cantonal code for Geneva-with the
416
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older German, but essentially preferring the French. This Hannoverian reform
proved an immediate success, and from this point onwards the programmatic
demands of the liberals could not be gainsaid despite the temporary general
failure of the 1848 movement. The complicated deliberations of the 1860's and
1870's leading to the code of 1877 could hardly move outside the limits fixed
by public acceptance of erstwhile liberal dogmas. In a large sense it was true
that France, defeated on the battlefields, had conquered in the law books. Bismarck implicitly referred to the same phenomenon when he said that the code
was Hannover's revenge for its defeat and amalgamation by Prussia in 1866,
for it was Leonhardt who had written the Frenchified Hannoverian code of
1850, became Prussian minister of justice after the absorption of Hannover,
and survived to influence the new all-German code.
This is part of the background of the Miindlichkeit, the orality of German
procedure exemplified by the conference method, and serves to explain the
strong, one may say the emotional, attachment of the German system to this
basic idea. The code-makers, however, had to translate the sloganeers' old
appeal -for an oral procedure into precise and viable modes, and this they did
by careful ratiocination, by a variety of compromises, by blending practices
drawn from the several parts of Germany with the French model as that had
itself been altered in German hands.
The enthusiasts of 1848 would perhaps have been not entirely satisfied
with the code of 1877 and might be less so with the present procedure. Thus
the place accorded in the code to written statements of position might have
disappointed at least the more extreme champions of orality, and we have seen
that the conference no longer comprises free recapitulation of positions. In
the vision of the 1848 reformers, the oral, open clash of the litigants pursuing
their competing self-interests was relied on both to propel and shape the proceedings. The reformers accepted that the court would have some duty of
elucidation, but they were against state tutelage in the form of the paternalistic
judge. Experience since 1877, however, showed that the parties themselves
would not give proper propulsion to the lawsuit, and control in this respect
has gradually passed to the judge. The directive-protective role of the judge at
conference as well as in other phases of the procedure, the bureaucratic tinge
of the lawsuit, result from a cumulation of forces, some of them going back
to the early days of the Hohenzollern dynasty. Under Frederick William I
and Frederick the Great, the minister Samuel von Cocceji improved the quality
of the Prussian judiciary but at the cost of leading the judges into the
bureaucratic hierarchy. German judges have never since escaped bureaucratic
involvement. As the late Piero Calamandrei said of the Italian judge, "Two
qualities that appear incompatible are thus united in the same person-the
constitutional independence of the function and the adminstrative dependence
of the functionary." 3 It is indeed a major concern of German procedural re3.

Calamandrei, Procedure and Democracy 40 (1956).
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form today to cure the dilemma by removing judges from the general class
of administrative officialdom. The administration of justice was seen by the
Prussians as only another state social service; this view combined with royal
distrust of the attorney class to give Prussia in 1793 and for about a halfcentury thereafter a procedural code which sought, although in the end vainly,
to go almost the whole way in committing the management of the civil lawsuit to the judges as civil servants, and correspondingly to eliminate the attorneys as champions of the parties. Although German scholars have sometimes discounted the importance of this Prussian development, it has, I think,
left its mark on German procedure. In the latter part of the nineteenth and
in the early years of the twentieth century, a stream of thought emanating
from Austria, more specifically from the great Austrian proceduralist Franz
Klein, gave measured justification for the proposition that the state should
strive to equalize opportunity in court proceedings, which were to be
viewed as a Massenerscheinung, a mass-phenomenon, having important social
purposes and consequences. Playing upon the German background, these ideas
led to the strengthening of article 139 and to other vital alterations of the German code.
So we can see that large historical forces including the movement of
general ideas in a given society may determine some of the main themes of a
procedural system. Scholars who accept this proposition as applied to the substantive law have sometimes been prone to ignore or minimize it in the procedural field, have confined attention too closely to particular contemporaneous
dissatisfactions as the determinants of specific procedural changes. But if large
historical pressures may be significant for procedural development, it is also
true that certain elections made by a system under no such grand impulsionseven elections of a technical character made more or less unwittingly-may
have almost equally decisive effect by setting up pervasive, interlocking, interdependent relationships throughout the process.
Obedience to the master idea of orality did not necessarily call for an
unsegmented system. On the contrary Leonhardt himself seems to have believed
that an open, oral procedure would become diffuse unless accompanied and controlled by some sharp stage division. The issue was not foreclosed by political
battlecries old or new. It seems rather to have been viewed as a technical
and prudential matter. Thus scholars debated the pros and cons of the Beweisinterlokut, an order which would definitely separate a pleading stage from
a proof stage and provide a clear pattern for the balance of the proceeding. In
the end this device was rejected. Among the considerations was this, that so
important an order would deserve to be subject to immediate review, but so
rampant an opportunity for interlocutory appeal would threaten delay. As the
system has worked out, there is a minimum of stage division or preclusion, and
prooftaking occurs on the installment plan interwoven with conferences.
Now see how this feature determines and intermeshes with others. Stag-
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gered prooftaking, which allows for afterthoughts, relieves the pressure to
articulate fixed and precise issues in advance of receiving proof in order to
prevent "surprise." There is little anxiety about the pleadings and small room
for devices to trim and correct them. So also "discovery" mechanisms ahead
of the display of proof in court, again directed to preventing surprise, can
hardly be felt as an urgent need in the German system. Lawyers can get
along with limited informal access to prospective witnesses. Incidentally, expense of investigation is not a large figure on the litigation budget. These are
a few obvious examples of how episodic prooftaking ramifies its effects further
and still further through the German procedure.
With us in this country jury trial must be carried out as a single continuous drama, for a jury cannot be assembled, dismissed and reconvened over
a period of time. We tend toward concentrated trial even when the judge sits
alone, perhaps by magnetic attraction to jury trial as the historic centerpiece
of civil procedure, perhaps because the system puts a high value on the trier's
fresh impression of live proof, perhaps for other reasons. Hence the opposing
sides must appear in court knowing the precise issues and fully armed and prepared to meet them. To these ends we have our pleadings and amendments
and motions, our discovery devices, our pretrial conference. Concentrated trial
forces accommodations in many rules and practices and has no doubt profoundly affected the character and role of the American lawyer and judge.
Decisive elections within a system bring on their characteristic dilemmas
and problems. To speak again of episodic as against concentrated prooftaking,
the former raises the specter of undue protraction of the case and this insistent
problem has prompted a series of German experiments with sanctions for delay,
stronger motor power in the court, use of single-judge proceedings to prepare
the case so that it can then be brought to a conclusion in one or a few sessions
before the full bench. But single-judge proceedings work against true "collegiality" (itself curiously connected in German thought with orality); they
also offend against the principle of "immediacy," the notion that judges who
have power of final decision should get a direct rather than a second-hand
impression of the cause-materials. With us, in actions at law the pleadings
were early relied on almost exclusively for defining issues, and this they did
very imperfectly. Facilities for discovery were meager. Yet jury trial must be
carried off without interruption. Bentham rightly said that trial in these circumstances must intrinsically lead to unjust decision, for upon trial the case
would often shape up differently than had been anticipated-yet there would
be no opportunity to search out additional facts or examine the implications
of theories now newly found relevant. With diminished faith in pleadings and
corrective motions, rights to discovery have been enlarged. The pretrial conference has been added. American code-makers have combined these devices
in varying ways in an effort to attain just the right mixture; recently they
have begun to flirt with the idea of using masters to energize the whole pretrial
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process. The current New York proposal attempts its own adjustment of the
basic elements, pleadings, discovery, and pretrial conference: it puts somewhat
greater stress on pleadings than has been lately fashionable, and makes a carefully calculated effort after much historic failure to elicit informing and helpful
initial statements of position from the parties. Elaborate mechanisms for perfecting definition of issues and laying bare the facts to prepare for trial create
dangers of excessive delay and expense, although concomitantly opening up
chances for disposition without trial; and we retain devices to avoid trial where
possible. It is in all events made doubly clear as we compare episodic with
concentrated prooftaking that adherence to one or the other mode affects the
k
code-maker's range of maneuver.
Probing further into attitudes toward facts and proof, do we not find on
the American side a striking concern with exhausting sources of evidence and
squeezing the last drop of advantage out of the pulp of multitudinous details?
Facts are today often thrice canvassed at heavy expense: by informal methods,
again by official discovery devices, and again at the trial proper. Pretrial sifting
of the facts may improve the chance for settlement or other disposition without
trial; it minimizes surprise at some risk of taking the fresh bloom off the testimony if the matter should reach trial. Although pretrial investigation is loose
and far-ranging, the trial itself, faithful to its tough adversary spirit, perhaps
responsive to the supposed needs of the jury as inexperienced, once-in-a-lifetime triers, proceeds according to a code duello of exclusionary rules of evidence,
with litigants "bound" by "their" witnesses. Examination and cross-examination, minutely recorded, pursue detail and test credibility with relentless
assiduity.
In many respects German practice turns the tables. Prooftaking in court
is notably untrammeled by tight rules of evidence: the triers are professionals,
the adversary spirit is muffled. To be sure a restrictive attitude persists toward
party-testimony. On a superficial view this attitude seems to be traceable to
a cynical estimate of the amount of truthtelling that can be expected from
those interested in the stakes. Continental writers sometimes relate it to a
desire to preserve the individual's dignity. As we have seen, the restriction is
in practice substantially overcome by interrogation of parties at conference;
and I should perhaps add that it does not go so far as to prevent blood tests
of the parties. The rules as to party-testimony thus hardly confound the
generalization that prooftaking is "free." On the other hand the search for
facts is neither broad nor vigorous. We have spoken of the limited access of
lawyers to prospective witnesses out-of-court. It is true that the episodic movement of the case affords opportunity to the litigant-led by the court or stirred
by hints in the testimony-to search for and offer additional proof whose
existence or pertinence was unknown to him at the start; and there is still a
further chance to enlarge the proofs on appeal. But episodic prooftaking, while
providing room for something on the order of American discovery, is not
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thought of in that way. So the tendency is to bar "fishing" exercises at prooftakings, that is, to disallow questions to witnesses designed merely to uncover
possible sources of proof. We may surely conclude that fact investigation in
the German system does not in practice attain anywhere near the strength of
the American.
The German method of taking testimony itself strikes an American lawyer
as lamentably imprecise. Remember that the initial and principal interrogation
of witnesses is conducted by the court which at least in the early stages of litigation will not have a comprehensive idea of the facts. Recording testimony in
paraphrase is well calculated to bleach out color and blur detail. Some evidence
may be received by the deciding plural bench only at relay from the singlejudge acting as representative of the court. Impressions of the evidence are
dulled by the very process of receiving it in installments over a period of time.
If the Germans are more casual than we are about the facts, if they are
content to get a kind of generalized or synoptic rather than meticulous perception of the events in suit, if, as I believe, prooftaking as a whole has a subsidiary
place in the German system, then we are led to speculations about the relation
of procedural forms to the style of the substantive law. Is a fully codified
substantive-law system of the civil-law type congenial to a pattern of fact-finding which would be felt to be inadequate to the needs of a common-law system?
Is it significant for procedural development that primary reference in the one
system is to the generalizations of the substantive code, not the case decisions,
while the other system grows by matching case with case? Or are we in this
country simply paying too much in time, effort, and money to pursue the finer
lineaments of truth which must in any event elude us? I pass over specific attitudes toward problems of forensic psychology, such as the question of the
value attached to oral as against documentary evidence, and I stop short of
the pons asinorum of "national character."
To sum up: I have touched upon certain of the forces which have bent
the German system of civil procedure into its characteristic patterns and forms
and I have posed some comparisons between the German and American procedure. Historical exegesis has a natural place in the comparative inquiry if
only because one cannot meaningfully juxtapose systems which one does not
reasonably well understand; it gives us, besides, a sense of the grip of particular
institutions upon a society and so of their susceptibility to change. Side-by-side
examination of systems puts in clearer light the crucial elections which they
have severally made. Again comparison invites thought about the interactions
of procedure with the rest of the legal cosmos, and frames cogent questions of
ultimate purpose and value.
III.
Let me now dwell upon some applications of the comparative study of
procedural systems. If, as I have tried to show, comparison whets understanding of what is central to a procedural style, helps to locate the linchpins of a
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procedural machine, it can tell the reformer where and how he must strike if
he is to produce truly significant results. Similarly, comparison shows up in
peculiarly lurid colors the uselessness, or worse, the danger of altering particular procedural devices which hang upon other mechanisms that are left
unchanged. A large number of procedural reforms attempted in various German
states in the early and mid-1800's suffered from this fault, and therefore failed.
The story of American procedural reform is not free of like failures.
Possibilities of lifting pieces from a foreign system and incorporating them
in the domestic must be approached with a sense of the interdependencies, the
syndromes, so to speak, within the system a quo and the system ad quem.
This is not to say that it is no use trying to import mechanisms for domestic
use unless the foreign system is brought over entire. For some procedural
devices can stand up pretty well in isolation from the rest of the system. I put
as possible examples the special "dunning" and documentary processes successfully employed in many cases in Germany. Another example which may
make the point is service by mail, a traditional usage in Germany and elsewhere, much adhiired by Bentham. This has in fact been progressively adopted
in our country, although its original parentage may not always have been
recognized. Professor Weinstein recently reexamined this device and gives it
some scope in his proposal for New York. A conversation with Professor
Homburger this past summer brought up an interesting example which may
lie on just the other side of the line. Consider the feasibility of introducing
here the German practice of having witnesses give their testimony in narrative,
followed by interrogation by the court; this to be followed in turn by interrogation in our conventional way by counsel for both sides. This may seem a
simple change that could be commended on various imaginable grounds, but
I would ask you to reflect on whether it could be effectively or safely engrafted
on our present system without other profound changes.
I turn to another facet of the comparative enterprise. It seems to me a
matter of capital importance for the uses of comparative study that we in this
country have been gradually mitigating the extremes of our inherited procedural
system. In this endeavor we usually and naturally seek to appeal where possible to models half-buried in our past: this is sound reformer's strategy. Yet
unmistakably we are moving along certain lines already familiar to foreign
procedures; and I make the simple suggestion that we could perhaps profit
by consulting the analogous foreign models and experiences directly and explicitly.
The pretrial conference is becoming a staple of American procedure: I
note that it is made mandatory in most classes of cases under the New York
proposal. Champions of the pretrial conference used to remind us of the oral
pleading of the yearbook period, but that hoary analogy was perhaps less
instructive than miindliche Verhandhng as to which the Germans have a long
accumulated experience. Proposals for pretrial masters suggest the model of
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the German single-judge although perhaps less cogently than that of the English High Court Master. (But a brief for the study of foreign systems should
be taken to include the English, which now departs markedly from our own.)
When the Federal Rules put the motion for failure to state a claim into connection with the motion for summary judgment, when Professor Weinstein
introduces flexible devices for "accelerated judgment" directing attention not
merely to naked questions of law disclosed by the pleadings but to the evidence
available to support the allegations, we are reminded both of the style of German pleadings and of their place in the German pattern. Federal Rule 42 and
parallel provisions of the New York proposal permitting the judge to order
separate trial of claims and issues, the recent rules of the Federal court for
the Northern District of Illinois looking to trial of the issue of liability distinct
from the trial of damages, call up German practice which extends further to
require the court to arrange prooftaking in the most expeditious way.
Clearly the judge's directive interest in and power over the conduct of
the lawsuit is on the increase in this country. Here one of the propagandist
appeals, if we may call them such without offense, has been to the picture of
the American judge as he is supposed to have been before Jacksonian ideas
sapped his strength; but again foreign modes offer interesting analogies. Our
recent codes and rules not only expressly allow the judge to act sua sponte or
in discretion on many particular occasions; by laying down general precepts
and avoiding detailed prescriptions they implicitly invite discretionary control
by the judge. A run through the New York proposal is revealing on these
matters. Or examine the Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial
of ProtractedCases recently issued as a report of a study group of the Judicial
Conference of the United States: this envisages very considerable judicial activity which is, however, all brought within the lee of general canons of the
Federal Rules.
Directive power in the court is closely linked with protective responsibility
and this too is being somewhat heightened in our own system. The protective
sense is readily called into action where a party appears without counsel or is
handicapped by inefficient representation or lack of funds, and it is interesting
to think here of the growth of small claims procedures in various American
states and of the fact that the present strengthened text of article 139 of the
German code was anticipated by a similar precept specially applicable to German courts of inferior jurisdiction. At the other extreme of cases involving
questions of high public importance, one sees examples of American courts not
at all content to let the parties present such facts and proffer such points of
law as they will. Our common law while relying generally and no doubt wisely
on party presentation, does sing antiphonal strains, which you can hear plainly
enough if you read authorities one way and the other on courts noticing on
appeal points not taken below, or on courts calling witnesses not offered by the
parties.
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Are we not also in the midst of a disenchantment with various exclusionary
rules of evidence. Note as an instance the disposition of the "dead-man's" problem made in the New York proposal. Some of the Federal appellate courts
have indeed openly invited District Judges when sitting without juries to wink
at the exclusionary rules short of the privileges. There is increasing dissatisfaction with the conception of party-proprietorship over witnesses, and I have
even heard a murmuring against lawyers' unconfined ex parte resort to sources
of proof which must engender suspicion of "coaching." A general unease with
our established methods of handling expert testimony is surely carrying us
nearer the German position. The now famous New York experiment with
"impartial medical testimony" reflects this unease although it is a response to
other dissatisfactions and problems as well.
I am not here urging the adoption in this country of the whole or any
part of the German system. I am suggesting the value of a cosmopolitan knowledge of procedural arrangements as an aid to the improvement of our own.
In the same sense I suggest that in trying to assess the practical operation of
our procedural system tout entier, as an uninhibited court administrator might
do, it is at least interesting and possibly instructive to take a perch outside
our system and to keep a different system in the corner of our eye.
Our major courts have relatively few judges. Using standard procedures
they can handle at best only a small volume of those elaborate and time-consuming contests called trials-especially time-consuming if they are jury trials.
Excessive delay on the calendars is therefore a constant menace. In metropolitan centers the whole apparatus is regularly threatened with emergency
if the.percentage of cases actually going to trial should perchance be fractionally increased. The mine run of cases involve disputed issues of fact and
therefore cannot be disposed of ahead of trial by the shortcuts which the system makes available. A prospect of inordinate delay on the calendars exerts
a pressure on litigants to settle, and the system seeks to persuade them to
do so as a means of fending off a burden of trials which it would find insupportable. Sometimes the pressures mount to an unwholesome pitch. Meanwhile the preparations and skirmishes before trial if seriously pursued entail
expense which will be added to if trial is finally unavoidable. We have inadequate data on the costs and economics of litigation-I am glad to see that
scholarly attention is being increasingly drawn to these matters-but expenses
appear to run high and consequential litigation tends to be prohibitive for
persons of moderate means except as the dubious institution of the contingent
fee, or insurance, itself expensive, may come in to help them as plaintiffs or
defendants. In theory, and no doubt oftentimes in practice as well, successful
prosecution of a civil action will not result in a full recovery because the major
expenses of litigation must be borne by the party without reimbursement; for
the same reason defense can never be fully successful in a financial sense.
Any capsulated statement of such large phenomena must distort and ex424
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aggerate, but allowing all plausible discounts the situation in this country is
not altogther happy. The elements of the German position are different, although again assessment is embarrassed by the unavailability of information.
To be sure the impulsion to settlement can be even fiercer with the Germans
than with us. But having a large complement of judges which can be rather
easily expanded to accord with needs, the Germans have an initial advantage
over us in meeting problems of delay in the courts. Delay when it occurs in
German courts of first instance is less obvious and therefore perhaps less irksome than American delay, for it does not generally consist in the courts'
inability to reach cases but rather in a protraction of the courts' handling
of cases through a long series of short Termine or sessions. The fees of German
lawyers are low, reflecting the fact that their activities in litigation are less
strenuous; or perhaps we should say that fees are held low by the statutory
tariffs and this together with other features of the system affects the scope of
lawyers' activities. State-provided legal aid contrasts sharply with our generally
meager provision for public assistance to poor persons in civil litigation, our
privately organized legal aid, and our contingent fee practice. German rules
governing reimbursement of litigation expenses-the basic doctrine of "loser
pays"--highlight neuralgic questions in our own system. As Professor Weinstein forthrightly says, "our costs practice is an historical footnote rather than
a defensible system.' 4 Very large issues; notably that of public access to the
courts, are certainly involved. I note that the New York proposal seeks at
several points to penalize abuse of procedural forms by casting the expense
including counsel fees on the guilty party. Similar provisions appear in the
German code but courts seem to shy away from applying them. Franz Klein
once took somewhat quixotic exception to the device because it implied that
anything goes provided the party is prepared to pay for it.
Our troubles in the matter of delay and related evils of course center in
our immense flood of accident cases. It would require a separate lecture to
begin to bring together the strands of law and practice relevant to the German
handling of this kind of litigation. Many factors converge that would probably
make the problem less troublesome for German courts than for ours even if
Germany had a comparable number of vehicles on the roads and a corresponding volume of accidents. The fact that judgments are limited fairly closely
to definite items of damage must itself encourage out-of-court settlement. The
in-court process is facilitated by the fact that thorough police files and records
of criminal proceedings frequently give clear definition to the basic facts of the
civil actions; there are no lay triers; expert testimony is largely under court
aegis; prooftaking on the existence of liability can be separated from that on
damages with a saving of time if there is a negative finding as to liability. An
interesting feature of the law, which has from time to time attracted attention
4. Weinstein, Proposed Revision of New York Civil Practice, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 50,
79 (1960).
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in this country, is that judgment for personal injuries resulting in lessened
earning capacity can take the form of an "annuity" rather than a lump sum.
One heed not subscribe to German methods in accident cases to believe that
they would be an interesting subject for sustained comparative investigation.,
Empirical and analytic work now going forward at various places in this
country may in time enable us to put a halter on the beast of delay in American courts if not to tame him altogether. The highly suggestive study conducted by the Chicago University Law School on the Supreme Court of New
York County6 has given us a measure of the problem which at least averts
despair. Pioneer work has been done at Columbia toward solving the old
puzzle of identifying in advance the cases which will prove "durable" if left
to ordinary ministrations. 7 Already we can suspect that the standard "remedies" for delay, for example, the A.B.A.'s "Ten Cures for Court Congestion,"
ranging from the pretrial conference to court reorganization, need much scientific refinement: thus the familiar assumption that use of the pretrial conference "across the board" tends to relieve court congestion has turned out to
be questionable: we shall perhaps know more about this when the Columbia
project completes its work in New Jersey. Anyway fallible guesswork is being
corrected by detached thought and rugged experimentation, and this is to the
good. Beyond those scientific wonders and horribles foreseen by Justice
Bernard Botein in his 1960 Cardozo Lecture8 as having a possible bearing on
law, there may lie the deus ex machina of a fool-proof safe means of mass
transportation-and delay in the courts may turn out to be as antiquated as a
knee-length lady's bathing suit. Perhaps our newly inspired economists will
venture to include justice along with education and housing in their welfare
programs, and solve delay and other problems by the proper expenditure of
more money.
For the present we stay with the point that our principal courts have the
look of huffing and puffing to take few cases the whole route, while over the
scene there hangs a pall of excessive delay, heavy expense, settlements artificially induced. Our system appears to work with expensive and brittle tools
to do a meticulous job on the particular case, but runs into trouble when it
faces the need for mass output. If the German system confronts this need
with a greater equanimity it is in part because it grinds the particular case
less exceeding fine.
Constituted and manned more or less as it now is, our court system will
continue to have decidedly limited capacities for effective work satisfactory to
the litigants and compatible with the larger claims of society. What classes
5. Cf. Kalven, Zeisel & Buchholz, Delay in the Courts, App. D (1959) (remarks on
Austrian methods).
6. Op. cit. supra note 5.
7. Rosenberg & Sovern, Delay and the Dynamics of Personal Injury Litigation, 59
Colum. L. Rev. 1115 (1959).
8. Botein, The Future of the Judicial Process: Challenge and Response, 15 The Record

152 (1960).
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of cases should it undertake to handle? Here enters a tangle of factors, among
them the symbolic importance of judicial process, the commitment of the
process not only to the right decision of the individual case but to the progressive development of the law, the available alternative means of managing
disputes removed from judicial process. Appraisal of substantive rules is of
course necessarily implicated. Fifty years ago Mr. Moorfield Storey, giving
the Storrs Lectures at Yale on the subject of The Reform of Legal Procedure,
argued vehemently that industrial accidents and accidents to passengers on
street railways should be removed from the courts and handled by other
means. Coming to the claims of non-passengers, he said, "they are comparatively few, and for the present may be left to the Courts, for I would not take
all the bread out of your expectant mouths." 9 Like Mr. Storey, I am addressing an audience of lawyers and law students, and I have a similar reluctance
to deprive you of a means of sustenance. Yet much of Mr. Storey's old argument applies to large classes of accident cases which swell the court calendars
today. It is a sardonic reflection, and yet not a complete answer to the argument, that were these cases now to be removed from the courts, we might face
a serious problem of what to do with surplus judges, if not surplus practitioners.
But if, all things considered, one or another class of business now in the
courts ought to go elsewhere, some business that has taken flight from the
courts should perhaps be brought back. I am by no means certain that the
movement of commercial cases to private arbitration ought to be encouraged
by the broad permissive legislation that is being written into the statute books.
In this expression of doubt I follow the Master of the Rolls, Lord Evershed, who was talking some years ago of the English situation.' 0 At
least we can agree in rejecting the view that parties to a controversy have a
natural right to decide for themselves that it be settled by any peaceful process
of their own choosing. It is significant for the present theme of our discourse
that when Justice Charles D. Breitel, in a forceful paper, examines how the
old staples of litigation can be tempted back into the courts, he concludes that
"the need is for informal and speedy summary proceedings as we have them
already in the courts, plus the use, borrowing from the administrative agency,
of court management of the case from start to finish, even as to the enforcement of the judgement, and the use of speedy, inexpensive and direct modes
of proof."-" Without discounting the value of the domestic models to which
Justice Breitel refers, I suggest that he could find nourishment for his ideas
in foreign examples.
Still considering the proper utilization of limited resources-and still insisting that the problem is not merely that of delay-we must ask whether
9. Storey, The Reform of Legal Procedure 85 (1911).
10. Evershed, The Influence and Importance of Practice and Procedure in the Supreme
Court (1953).
11. Breitel, The Quandary in Litigation, 25 Mo. L. Rev. 225, 235 (1960).
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an institution so consuming of time and effort as the jury ought to be perpetuated on its historic lines in civil causes. We might conclude with all due
caution that it could be eliminated with positive advantage in the kind of case
where the legal rules do not appeal to general community standards of justifiable and unjustifiable conduct as they exist at the particular time; and all the
more so where the further factor exists that technical knowledge or experience
is required for thorough understanding of the case, or it is important that
decision upon recurring fact-patterns shall be predictable and regular. Although at the moment no candidate for the New York legislature or Congress
would think it prudent to run for office on a platform of limiting the constitutional jury-right, the question is, I think, coming more and more to be submissible to reasoned public debate.
Reflecting on the rate of change in life about us, we cannot be astonished
that important changes are taking place in the nature and quality of the disputes that the courts are being called on to settle. Justice Botein has noted
some of these changes, and he foresees others. He urges us to anticipate these
developments, to run alongside or ahead of them rather than to be dragged
along feet forward. This preachment applies as much to procedural as to
substantive regulation. What procedural accomodations ought to be made to
meet those myriad "personal problem" cases to which Mrs. Maxine Boord Virtue has been calling urgent attention, cases which threaten to transform metropolitan courts into "general rehabilitative clinics"? 12 The danger here is less
that of delayed than of perfunctory disposition of cases. What are the implications for procedure in Lord Radcliffe's recent reference to the increasing
tyranny of groups over their members in our pluralistic society? 13 Professor
Thomas A. Cowan senses the emergence of new problems in the assertion of
14
rights by outsiders against groups and by groups against outsiders.
Movements in society which at present hardly register on the most delicate
seismographs may in time overwhelm our procedural forms and call for fundamental reconstruction. At an earlier stage they may make limited claims for
special treatment, for the engrafting of special procedures upon our unitary
system of adjudication. The great advantages of a single, unified mode of
court procedure have been perceived by the German and Anglo-American
theorists alike, but it is important to appreciate what is meant by the concept.
When our forms of action at law with their differing internal procedures were
abolished, when the procedural cleavage between law and equity was obliterated
and all court procedure was brought together in a common system, the goal
was not absolute procedural uniformity. It would have been silly to enact
that a bankruptcy must go forward exactly like an action of slander, it would
12. Virtue, The Two Faces of Janus: Delay in Metropolitan Trial Courts, 328 The
Annals 125, 133 (1960).
13. Radcliffe, The Law and Its Compass (Julius Rosenthal Foundation Lectures for
1960).

14. Cowan, Group Interests, 44 Va. L. Rev. 331 (1958).
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have been at least awkward to require a matrimonial case to be treated exactly
like an action on a promissory note. The object was rather that the court
process should be single except as significant differences in the nature of the
cases called for differentiation in their procedural management, and a burden
was cast on those who asserted a need for variations from the accepted general
mode. The objection to the old procedural differences among the law categories
and between law and equity, as Bowen and Maitland and others well understood, could not be put on the mere fact of these differences but rather on the
lack of functional justification for them. This point needs to be recalled lest
the rational basis of the unitary procedure be lost to view and the concept
become a mere fetish. In both the German and modern American procedures
we find a sound resistance to the undue proliferation of special forms. We
find also-a, point already suggested-judicial accommodation to particular
needs through the use of discretion under procedural canons broadly stated.
A certain amount of accommodation of this latter sort is probably encouraged in
Germany by the regular practice of setting up court chambers to deal exclusively with particular classes of cases-accidents, rent claims, and so on.
For alterations of procedure which the future may invite or compel,
Germany will look, as it has traditionally done, to the hard process of legislation, and for internal administration of the courts it will rely, as it has done
in the past, on the departmental ministries of justice working with the court
presidents who deal in turn with the presiding judges of court chambers. This
ministerial oversight contributes, as I have suggested, to the bureaucratic
orientation of German judges; we in this country are finding in the professional
court administrator or administrative office working under court control an
institution more congenial to our conception of judicial independence. Judicial
rule-making on the new American style has marked advantages over legislation
simpliciter as an instrument for the progressive development of procedure, and
especially when it is supported by continuing active study by a body outside
the court. These advantages are well known, but I would stress a potentiality
of rule-making that has not been sufficiently exploited, and that is its use for
frankly experimental purposes. Justice Brennan recently spoke to this point,
suggesting in particular that local rules by the Federal District Courts can
serve as experimental forerunners of general rules.15 To be sure, all lawmaking
should be thought of as experimental, but procedural rules promulgated by
courts lend themselves peculiarly well to experimental technique. Surely it
will not do to refuse the trial-and-error method on the ground, which is unhappily correct, that it is often hard to trace effects back to causes in the
complex, multi-factored social field. The possibility of significant rule-making
by German courts on anything like the American pattern seems quite remote,
probably entirely excluded, in part because of Germany's allegiance to legisla15.

Brennan, J. dissenting in Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 652, 662 (1960).
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tive codification h la continentale, in part because of the structure of their
courts and the status of their judges. At first sight, indeed, judicial rule-making seems to make against our own image of the judge as interpreter, not
maker of laws; but the addition of a rule-making function in the adjective field
goes down well provided legislative claims to ultimate power are not rudely
shaken. In retrospect it seems very clear that the New Jersey Supreme Court
went too far in banishing the legislature altogether from the field of procedure. 16 But I am inclined to think that those who now envisage a rule-making
power in New York that would stop short of superseding existing statutes do
not go far enough. The objection is somewhat mitigated but to my mind not
wholly overcome by the fact that the new system would start out by embodying most of the procedure in rules capable of being superseded by later
rules. Perhaps the peculiar New York tradition makes it wise for the reformer
1
to tread lightly here. Justice Halpern suggests as much in a recent writing,'
and I would be content to rely on his perspicacity.
I suggest that the rule-making power supplies us with a powerful instrument, absent in Germany and other civil-law countries, for the continuing
betterment of procedure; and to this I want to add that there is a tendency in
current American legal thought which should contribute to the same end. This
is a tendency to concentrate on what Professor Fuller, with Benthamite ingenuity in word construction, has called "eunomics," "the science, theory or study
of good order and workable arrangements,"' 8 and hence, I take it, of
procedure in the large sense of the word. My revered teacher Morris R. Cohen
spoke of "the tendency of all modern scientific and philosophic thought . . .
to weaken the distinction between substance and attribute . . . and to emphasize the importance of method, process, or procedure."' 9 In the law it is perhaps
a feeling of helplessness about major substantive solutions that leads scholars
to dwell on adjective structures. We see turbulences and strifes arising in
society for which we have no solutions that promise to be durable, and so we
try to set up neutral mechanisms by which the contending parties may be
brought to adjustments however temporary these may turn out to be. The
United Nations has been serving a like purpose on a larger stage. Looking
about my own law school, I find a strong involvement in process, in the assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of particular methods of reaching adjustments up and down the line of private and governmental activity. There is
a similar concern among lawyers generally.
16. Kaplan & Greene, The Legislature's Relation to Judicial Rulemaking: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 234 (1951); Pound, Procedure Under
Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 28 (1952); Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. of
Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1958).
17. Halpern, Book Review, 34 St. John's L. Rev. 385 (1960).
18. Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century, 6 J. Leg. Ed. 457, 477 (1954).
19. Cohen, Law and the Social Order 128 (1933).
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IV.
I have spent much of your time putting the German by the side of the
American procedural system, but I have expounded no general methodology
of systematic comparison-an exercise de rigueur for comparativists. I shall
beg off on the ground that I am not an accredited member of the comparativelaw fraternity. A sortie by such an amateur as myself into this jurisprudential
matter would be out of place at your school, which has nurtured the distinguished comparativists, Professors Lenhoff and Laufer. Let me venture the
thought, however, that an eclectic approach mixed with a kind of naive receptivity to the foreign and the strange may serve reasonably well in lieu of a
fixed philosophy of comparison. The Germans themselves have been much
interested in measuring systems according to standards such as orality, partypresentation, and the like. Such standards have their uses as a check-list for
observation. That the standards are themselves redolent of German procedural
history does not necessarily deprive them of general utility. I suppose, too, that
some sort of "functional" attitude toward comparison is almost inevitable for
the legal mind in this quarter of the twentieth century. But functional analysis
can be carried out at various levels of discourse. Thus one can postulate initial
"notice-giving" to the defendant as a function of procedural systems and inquire about the particular means provided by the several systems to carry
out this function. Or one can postulate larger and more elevated functions.
Professor Ernst Rabel said: "Every comparison . . . needs a common de-

nominator, a tertium comparationis. For me in these fifty years past, this has
always been the social purpose of the rules and the service of the concepts to
this purpose." 20 This formulation by Rabel leaves to choice the level of inquiry, and I imagine that what is ultimately wanted is interpenetration of
studies at various levels, always holding in mind, for reasons already sufficiently
stated, that rules and devices are to be seen not as detached entities but as
organic parts of going systems.
To conclude: we said earlier that the systems we have been examining
profess similar aims. Fundamentally the systems seek to promote the use of
reason in the process of adjudication. But this purpose does not delimit a
single, narrow road to its attainment, for there are a number of plausible ways
of going about garnering, presenting, and considering proofs and reasoned
arguments so that substantive norms may be cogently applied to the resolution
of disputes. Moreover the aim of reasoned decision must be held in balance
with a host of other aims including speed and economy. Each system can thus
be viewed as a vector of considerations: the considerations are similar but
the values assigned to them in the systems differ, the vectors differ. For
example, the American system exploits the free-wheeling energies of counsel
and places them in adversary confrontation before a detached judge. The
20. Rabel, in Assn. of Am. Law Schools, Summarized Proc. of Inst. in Teaching of
International and Comparative Law 111 (1948).
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German system puts its trust in a judge of paternalistic bent acting in cooperation with counsel of somewhat muted adversary zeal. Vigorous counsel will
search out the facts and law fully and carefully; the clash between them will
bring out the true points at issue; the judge will come to a sounder decision if
he has not sought to advise the litigants and been thus obliged to carry successive opposing briefs. So the American system argues. But adversary contention can obscure rather than clarify if left unchecked; it tends toward expense;
it makes against equality of opportunity before the tribunal. So the German
system retorts. True, the elements of each system have been determined in
some measure by historical stresses and accidents, not by deliberate decision
based on analysis. But they are still submissible to assessment in terms of
postulated aims, and such an exercise is valuable because the systems are
capable of some degree of deliberate choice. In the end the m6lange of rules
and habits which together make up a procedural system somehow accords with
the larger patterns of the society which the system serves, and it is in this
sense that Calamandrei spoke of a procedural system reflecting the society in
which it is found as a drop of water reflects the sky.
Comparative study has been urged iii the past on the high ground that
it was a means to the discovery of a ius naturale, a Natural Law, a law corresponding to "an ideal fitness of things," matched to the good life whose shape
was itself uniquely fixed by the invariant characteristics of man and his unchangeable predicament in the universe. One can reject this high ground and
still find some modest values in the comparative undertaking. Do not men of
law customarily accept one rule as against the other, one mode as against the
next, by tracing out imaginatively the probable consequences of the alternative
courses, then judging, "These consequences we think good, those not good,"
in the light of purposes felt or perceived. Knowledge of foreign systems can
reveal a plurality of possible courses, assist in plotting probable results, and
refine understanding of objectives.
I venture to say that the humanistic impulse which has inspired the best
comparative work would have engaged the sympathetic interest of Mr. James
McCormick Mitchell, in whose name this lecture has been given.

